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We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect
labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and rms endogenously
select the sector they are active in and choose the amount of their sector-specic investments.
To enter the high-skill sector, workers must pay a xed cost that we interpret as a direct cost
of education. Given the distribution of the agents across sectors, in equilibrium, in each sector
there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, due to non-contractibility of
investments. A second source of ineciency is related to the self-selection of the agents into
the two sectors: typically too many workers invest in education. Under suitable restrictions on
the parameters, the joint eect of the two distortions is that equilibria are characterized by
too many people investing too little eort in the high skill sector. We also analyze the welfare
properties of equilibria and study the eects of several tax policies on the total expected surplus.
In particular, we consider the equilibrium associated with a at labor income tax. Under suitable
restrictions on the parameters, a revenue neutral progressive change in the marginal tax rates
is welfare improving.
Zusammenfassung
Wir untersuchen eine Zwei-Sektoren- Okonomie mit Investitionen in Human- und physisches
Kapital und unvollkommenen Arbeitsm arkten. Human- und physisches Kapital sind heterogen.
Arbeiter und Unternehmen w ahlen endogen sowohl den Sektor, in dem sie t atig werden, als
auch die Menge der sektorspezischen Investitionen. F ur Arbeiter fallen Fixkosten an, falls sie
im Sektor t atig werden wollen, der ausschlielich hoch qualizierte Arbeiter besch aftigt. F ur
eine gegebene Verteilung der Agenten  uber die Sektoren ist das Gleichgewicht dieser  Okonomie
durch Unterinvestition in Human- und physisches Kapital in beiden Sektoren gekennzeichnet.
Urs achlich daf ur ist die Annahme, dass Investitionen nicht vertragsf ahig sind. Eine zweite Ur-
sache von Inezienz ist die Selbstselektion von Agenten in die beiden Sektoren: typischerweise
w ahlen zu viele Arbeiter den Sektor f ur Hochqualizierte. Zusammen bewirken diese beiden Ver-
zerrungen, dass im Gleichgewicht zu viele Arbeiter im Hochqualizierten-Sektor t atig werden
wollen, die dabei aber insgesamt zu wenig Bildungsanstrengung in Humankapital investieren.
Weiter untersuchen wir die gleichgewichtigen Wohlfahrtswirkungen von Steuern. Es zeigt sich,
dass f ur realistische Parameterrestriktionen eine budgetneutrale progressive  Anderung der mar-
ginalen Steuers atze wohlfahrtssteigernd wirkt.
JEL classication: J24; H2
Keywords: Human capital; Eciency; Labour income tax
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In the last few decades, causes and consequences of investments in human capital have been
a central eld of research due to several motivations. Among them, the relevance of human
capital externalities in growth theory, and the issues related to the dynamics of the wage
premium and, more generally, to the evolution of income distribution. Still, the analysis of
human capital externalities is far from settled from both the empirical and the theoretical
viewpoints. Empirically, it is not obvious that there are signicant, positive dierences between
social and private returns, at least at the level of subsidies prevailing in most Western countries.1
From a theoretical viewpoint, the microeconomic mechanism generating the externality is not
fully understood. A better understanding of its nature has policy relevance. This is true even if
one is willing to take for granted that there are no signicant, unexploited, positive externalities,
because this is typically obtained with high subsidies to education.2
In this paper, we extend the microeconomic analysis of the distortions related to investments
in human capital and derive some results on the welfare eects of dierent policies: xed ta-
xes/subsidies on the direct cost of the acquisition of high skill human capital, and taxes on
labor income, or - equivalently in our set-up - on the investment in human capital.
We consider economies with three key features:
1. Ex-ante, workers are heterogeneous, while rms are identical,
2. Investments in human and physical capital are non-contractible,
3. There are two separate sectors employing dierent kinds of human and physical capital,
so that an agent must choose both the level of his/her investment and its type.
The economy is basically a two-sector generalization, with sector specic inputs, of the model
considered in Acemoglu (1996), which aims to provide an explicit equilibrium foundation for the
existence of positive externalities related to human capital accumulation. In his framework, rms
and workers choose the amount of their investments. Then, they are matched randomly (but
preserving full employment), and income distribution is determined by a bargaining process.
While a similar analysis could be carried out in several frameworks with the properties listed
above, we focus the analysis on a Roy model of investments in human capital which is as close as
possible to the one analyzed by Acemoglu. Indeed, after agents have chosen the sector they are
going to be active in, i.e., the nature of their investment, our model reduces to a pair of separated
Acemoglu's economies. In our set-up, income distribution takes place through bargaining, too.
However, when workers are heterogeneous, the driving features of our results are asymmetric
information on the workers' types and non-contractibility of the investments. The bargaining
set-up is, of course, important, but it does not aect some key aspects of the welfare results.3
Our main departure from Acemoglu (1996) is that we adopt the notion of human capital put
forth in Roy (1951): there are distinct markets for high skill and low skill labor, and we assume
that they are perfectly non-substitutable. However, contrary to what is often assumed in Roy
models, once a worker has selected the type of human capital she wants to acquire, she still has
1 For the U.S.A., a negative conclusion is reached, for instance, by Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996)
and by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). For E.U. countries, the results in De la Fuente (2003) are also negative.
See also Krueger and Lindhal (2000).
2 In 2005, in the OECD average, 85.5% of the direct cost of education (all levels included) is nanced by public
sources (see OECD (2008, Table B3.1, p. 251)). The EU19 average is 90.5%. At the tertiary level, these
percentages are, respectively, 73.1% and 82.5% (Table B3.2b, p. 253).
3 Indeed, one can dene economies with perfectly competitive spot labor markets, asymmetric information and
lack of contractibility, where there is still a negative externality in human capital investments.
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units of high skill (low skill, respectively) labor.4 Hence, each worker makes two separate choices,
at the intensive and the extensive margin. Most of the recent literature takes a dierent point of
view, adopting the eciency units approach with homogeneous human capital, therefore ruling
out, by assumption, all the consequences of self-selection of agents into dierent labor markets,
which are, instead, relevant from both the theoretical and the empirical viewpoints.5
With imperfect markets and self-selection of workers into dierent labor markets, two distinct
distortions are at work. Lack of contractibility of investments and the bargaining set-up generate
a hold-up problem, inducing an ineciently low level of investments, in human and physical
capital of both types (hence, in each sector). This is the key mechanism at play in Acemoglu's
paper. Secondly, given that workers are heterogeneous, when a subset of them switches from
one sector to the other, there is an impact on the distribution of returns of the rms, hence
on their optimal investments. In turn, this aects the optimal level of investments of workers.
This second potential source of distortion is independent of the random matching set-up, and
is at work even when spot labour markets are perfectly competitive (but lack of contractibility
and asymmetric information hold).6 This mechanism has been analyzed in the economics of
education literature at least since Betts (1998).7
Therefore, in our set-up, public policies have two distinct eects on expected total surplus, our
measure of welfare. The rst is their impact on the level of the optimal investments of the
agents acquiring a sector-specic skill: we will refer to it as incentive eect. The second is their
impact on the agents' distribution across markets, i.e., the composition eect. In \pure" Roy
models (with self-selection, but no choice of the investment eort) only the composition eect
is at play. In \pure" eciency-units models (without self-selection) only the incentive eect
is at work. As usual, a hold-up problem on the returns on the investment in human capital
induces underinvestment in education: less workers invest in education and each worker invests
less eort than in the case of full appropriation of the marginal return of the investment. The
impact on welfare of the composition eect is less obvious. An improvement of the conditionally
expected level of human capital has always a positive eect on equilibrium utilities of all the
workers and on the prots of the rms which remain active in the same sector. The expected
producer's surplus of the rms which switch sector may actually decrease, but, under suitable
restrictions on the parameters, the total eect is always positive. Bear in mind that, in our
economy, there is always full employment and, therefore, the classical congestion externality,
characterized by the violation of the Hosios condition, is absent.
We consider two separate sectors, using sector specic inputs (high/low skill human and physical
capital). The crucial property is that human and physical capital are heterogeneous. To identify
one type of capital with one sector somewhat simplies the set-up and sharpens the welfare
results. However, the two distinct distortions would be at work even with just one productive
4 As usual, we can also interpret eort in the acquisition of human capital as elastic supply of labor of a given
skill.
5 A survey supporting this claim is in Sattinger (1993). A more recent discussions of the dierent empirical
implications of eciency units vs. Roy models is, for instance, in Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001).
Investments in human capital in a two-sector economy with frictions due to random matching (but with
perfectly inelastic supply of human and physical capital) have been studied in Sattinger (2003), Charlot and
Decreuse (2005), and Mendolicchio, Paolini, and Pietra (2010).
6 With perfectly competitive spot labor market, the hold-up problem disappears, and in each sector (taking
as given the distribution af agents) investments are at their constrained ecient level. However, due to
asymmetric information and lack of contractibility, the composition eect still induces constrained ineciency
of equilibria, which are always characterized by overinvestment in education.
7 In the context of random matching models, it has been rst studied in Charlot and Decreuse (2005).
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substitutability. Bear in mind that whenever in what follows we mention the two sector structure
of the economy, we implicitly mean that the two sectors use dierent kinds of human and
physical capital.
Finally, in our full employment set-up, the elasticity of investments in physical capital plays a
key role. Individual eort of workers depends upon the composition of the pool of workers in a
sector only indirectly, because of its direct eect on the optimal level of investments in physical
capital, which, in turn, is increasing in the conditional expectation of the eort of the workers
active in a market. Hence, our model adopts, in a parsimonious way, the simplest structure of
the economy which may deliver the basic insight.
We provide two sets of results concerning the eciency properties of the equilibria. First,
we show that an appropriate policy of subsidies to the investments and taxes on the direct
costs of education can implement the constrained ecient allocation. Secondly, we consider
the equilibrium associated with an arbitrary (but not too high) at labor income tax and
study the welfare eects of changes in the tax structure. This allows us to get some intuition
concerning the relative magnitudes of incentive and composition eects. Some of the results
in Acemoglu (1996) survive in our class of economies. For instance, in both cases, the human
capital externality is related to its (sector-specic) average level. There are, on the other hand,
sharp dierences with respect to the policy prescriptions: in the one-sector model, subsidies
to investments in human capital (or to labor supply) are unambiguously benecial. This is
because only the incentive eect is at play: a subsidy to the investments in human capital
(or a reduction of the labor income tax rate) of any subset of agents increases them and,
therefore, their expected value as a rst order eect. This has a positive impact on the rms'
investment decisions and, in turn, further increases the optimal investment of all the workers.
This chain of positive feedbacks guarantees that this is welfare improving. To reformulate the
point dierently: in one-sector economies, there is a unique distortion induced by the hold-up
problem which induces underinvestment for both rms and workers. Any policy increasing the
investments of any subset of agents is welfare improving.
With two sectors, the incentive eect of a policy can be strengthened, weakened, or overturned,
by its composition eect. Consider, for instance, a reduction in the marginal tax rate on low
labor income (in our set-up: on the income of low-skill workers). If total factor productivities are
suciently diverse across sectors and workers suciently heterogeneous, this always increases
total surplus, because the positive eect on individual eort in the low-skill sector is strengt-
hened by the composition eect, i.e., by the improvement of the expected human capital of
the pool of workers in both markets. An increase in taxes on the direct costs of education also
increases total surplus, just because of its composition eect. On the other hand, a decrease in
the marginal income tax rate for high-skill workers has a (rst order) positive incentive eect
on their investments, but a negative composition eect. Hence, it always has a negative impact
on the equilibrium utility of low-skill workers (and on the equilibrium prots of the rms active
in that sector). The total eect for the agents active in the high-skill sector may be positive
or negative, according to the magnitudes of the (positive) incentive eect and the (negative)
composition eect. We provide a robust example where the eect of such a tax rate reduction
on total surplus is negative. We conclude considering revenue neutral tax changes: the most
interesting result is that, under our assumptions, a progressive change in the marginal labor
income tax rates is welfare improving.
There is a large literature on the eects of subsidies to education and of labor income taxes on
accumulation of human capital. The usual arguments favoring subsidies hinge either on their
positive externality eects, or on the existence of liquidity constraints. Additionally, subsidies
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tive policies (see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Jacobs (2005, 2007), Jacobs and Bovenberg
(2008), Jacobs, Schindler and Yang (2009), Schindler and Weigert (2008, 2009)). The last two
aspects may be both empirically and theoretically important, but we abstract from them, fo-
cussing the analysis on the pure eciency issue related to the presence of a hold-up problem
and of self-selection. The classical analysis of the eects of labor income tax on investments
in human capital started with the seminal papers by Ben-Porath (1970), Boskin (1975) and
Heckman (1976).8 A at labor income tax has a negative impact on human capital accumula-
tion just because of the non-deductibility of the direct costs of education. On the other hand,
by depressing the net interest rate, in fully specied life-cycle models of consumer behavior, a
tax on total income may actually have a positive eect. Eaton and Rosen (1980) extend the
analysis to (uninsurable) multiplicative wage uncertainty, pointing out that a at earning tax
aects investments in human capital through its eects on their riskiness and (via an income
eect) on the attitude toward risk (see, also, Anderberg and Andersson (2003), and Anderberg
(2009)). Consider now a progressive income tax (compared with a revenue-neutral at one).
The canonical conclusion is that it discourages investments at the high skill level, while it may
encourage them for the less skilled. While this literature provides us with many insights, it
mostly deals with economies where there is no self-selection into dierent skills, so that one of
the key mechanism at work in our economy is absent. Also, bear in mind that, in our set-up, at
the equilibrium, workers face no uncertainty, so that the mechanism pointed out in Eaton and
Rosen (1980) is absent.
A nal remark: we consider investments in education as a benchmark case where heteroge-
neous agents make choices involving both the extensive and the intensive margins and where
the composition eect matters. There are many other possible applications of the same basic
framework, such as choices involving migration.
2. The Model
The economy is composed by two separate production sectors, denoted by s 2 fne;eg: Workers
(denoted by a subscript i when we refer to individuals, I when we refer to their set) and rms
(denoted by j and J; respectively) can choose to enter one of the two-sector, paying a xed cost.
Workers' costs, (cne
I ;ce
I); are exogenous, and can be interpreted as private, direct, xed costs
of education (tuitions and the like). We denote rms' costs (dne
J ;de
J): They are endogenously
determined, and will be discussed later on.
There are two intervals of equal length of workers and rms, 
I = 
J  [;]  R++; both
endowed with the Lebesgue measure. Each interval is partitioned into two sets, f
ne
I ;
e
Ig  
P
I
and f
ne
J ;
e
Jg  
P
J ; determined endogenously. Let (
s
I) ((
s
J)) denote the measure of the
set 
s
I (
s
J; respectively). In sector s, production requires a rm j (with physical capital ks
j)
and a worker i (with stock of human capital hs
i): Once the partitions 
P
I and 
P
I are given; each
sector of the economy reduces to the set-up studied in Acemoglu (1996). Firms are identical,
and choose their investments in physical capital to maximize their expected prots. Workers
choose their investments in human capital to maximize their expected utilities.
The economy lasts one period, divided into several subperiods. In subperiod 0, rms and workers
enter one of the two sectors and carry out their investments. At 1, each rm active in sector s
8 In our economy, one obtains substantially identical results considering direct (non-linear) subsidies to eort
and subsidies to the direct costs of education. Previous, related work in this area includes Blankenau (2005),
Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009), Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Lloyd-Ellis (2000), Sahin (2004), and Su
(2004).
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on). In the nal subperiod, production takes place and the total output of each match is split
according to the Nash bargaining solution with exogenous weights  and (1   ):9 Evidently,
given that investments are carried out before matches take place, agents cannot contract with
their partners a given level of investment. This is one of the key features of the economy.
For each worker active in sector s, the utility function is
Us
i (Cs
i ;hs
i) = Cs
i  
1
i
h
s(1+ )
i
1 +  
;
where Cs
i denotes consumption, hs
i is the amount of human capital (or the labor supply). Let
cs
I be the (xed) cost of the investment in sector s human capital. Then, in the absence of
taxes and subsidies, if worker i is active in sector s and matched with rm j, Cs
i is given by
labor income minus cs
I: Workers are heterogeneous because of the parameter i; indexing their
marginal disutility of eort: ceteris paribus, larger values of i are associated with higher values
of the optimal choice of human capital. Without any essential loss of generality, we assume that
i = i; and that i is uniformly distributed on [;];  > 0. More general assumptions on the
distribution of i would not change any essential result.
Technologies are described by a pair of Cobb-Douglas production functions with constant re-
turns to scale. When active in sector s; and matched with worker i with human capital hs
i, rm
j has production function
ys
ij = Ashs
i k
s(1 )
j ;
with Ae > Ane: Let p be the unit price of physical capital in both sectors. This implies some
loss of generality, but simplies notation and computations. Most important, similar results
hold for pe 6= pne:
As we will see, given any arbitrary partition of workers and rms (compatible with full employ-
ment), expected producers' surpluses are positive in both sectors and always larger in sector e.
To avoid additional complications not really germane to our main issue, and to maintain the
similarity with Acemoglu's model, we want to consider an economy with full employment at
the equilibrium. This requires that, at the equilibrium, each agent is actually matched with a
partner. We assume, as implicit in Acemoglu (1996), that the matching function guarantees
with probability one a match to each agent, provided that (
s
I) = (
s
J):10 Given the fo-
cus of the paper, the partition 
P
I must be determined endogenously. Hence, to guarantee full
employment, we need that, at each equilibrium, (
s
I) = (
s
J). The easiest way to obtain
this property is to introduce a feature of the economy such that equilibrium expected prots
are always equal in the two sectors. One way to obtain this is to assume that the technology
exploited in sector ne is free, while the one adopted in sector e is protected by a patent, ow-
ned by some outside agent.11 The right to use the patent is auctioned o to rms before the
rm-worker-match is obtained.12 Given that, at an equilibrium, expected prots in both sectors
must be identical, the equilibrium royalties must be equal to the (positive) dierence between
the expected producer's surpluses in the two sectors. Then, at each equilibrium, each rm is
indierent among sectors, so that we can choose 
P
J with (
s
I) = (
s
J), the property we
9 For a rationalization of this allocation rule in this context, see the Appendix in Acemoglu (1996). We assume
that  is sector-invariant. Given that it is exogenous, to let it vary across sectors would just introduce more
notation without providing any substantive additional insight.
10 A commonly used function which delivers this property is s
j =
minf(
s
I);(
s
J)g
(
s
J) ; where s
j is the probability
of a match for a rm active in sector s.
11 Clearly, nothing would change if each technology were subject to a distinct patent.
12 An auction delivering the result we need is based on closed envelope, rst price bids by the rms. The royalty
is allocated to each rm bidding the maximum price.
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islands, with an identical \number" of rms and workers on each island, no mobility across
islands and asymmetric information on the workers' types.13
Without any loss of generality, the prices of both kinds of output are set equal to 1 and,
therefore, omitted.
Finally, notice that there are always three additional, trivial, equilibria: the ones where all the
workers and the rms are in one of the two sectors, and the one where none is active in any
sector. As usual, we ignore them.
3. Equilibrium
Later on, we will show that, at the equilibrium, it is always 
e
I = [
F;] (or 
e
I = ;); where 
F
denote the equilibrium value of the threshold in the economy with frictions.14 Hence, we can
restrict the analysis to partitions 
P
I and 
P
J dened by an arbitrary level of the threshold,
denoted b , and write 
s
J(b ) and 
s
I(b ):
For future reference, we determine the optimal amount of investments assuming that there is
a public intervention dened by a pair of vectors 
s  (s;
s;cs
I);   (
e;
ne); describing
(possibly) sector specic subsidies and taxes. We assume that there are step-linear taxes on
labor income (with rates s; s = ne;e); and on the cost of the investments in physical capital
(with rates 
s; s = ne;e); and xed taxes, or subsidies, on the direct costs of education, cs
I
(we will always set cne
I = 0): We write the tax rates as sector specic just to simplify the
notation: at equilibrium, this system of taxes is isomorphic to a system of step-linear taxes on
labor income and on investments in physical capital.15
Pick an arbitrary threshold b : If active in sector s; rm j selects the value of ks
j solving the
expected prots maximization problem
choose ks
j 2 argmax
ks
j
E
s
I(b )

(1   )Ashs
i k
s(1 )
j   p(1 + 
s)ks
j

  ds
J
 (1   )AsE
s
I(b ) (hs
i )k
s(1 )
j   p(1 + 
s)ks
j   ds
J; (s)
where, given any random variable xs; with xs : 
s
I ! R; (or ys; with ys : 
s
J ! R), E

s
I(b )(xs
j) 
R

s
I(b ) x
s
idi
(
s
I(b )) (or E

s
J(b )(ys
i)) denotes the conditional expectation of xs
i over the set 
s
I(b ) (or of ys
j
over 
s
J(b )):
The pair of maps Ks(b ;); s = ne;e; denes the optimal investment in physical capital for
the rms active in the two sectors. They are j invariant because rms in each sector are
identical, and depend upon the exogenous vector ; the arbitrary thresholdb ; and the conditional
expectations E
s
I(b ) (hs
i ): Let s(i;b ;) be the surplus (because inclusive of ds
J) of the rm
matched with worker i in sector s:
13 A third alternative would be to assume that rms cannot move across sectors. A non-null measure of rms
is exogenously assigned to each sector. We then pick a matching function which always guarantees that each
rm is matched with a worker (and conversely) for each non-trivial partition of the workers. As long as there
is a continuum of agents in each sector, this can be done. Of course, this approach would break down if we
had a nite number of agents and, anyhow, is based on a very ad hoc trick.
14 Obviously, the worker with i =  is indierent between the two sectors. For convenience, we assume that
he/she enters sector e:
15 Evidently, the same closed form could be obtained by using taxes (or subsidies) based on the eort in
education, which, however, could not be directly observable.
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choose hs
i 2 argmax
hs
i
E
s
J(b ) (Us
i (:)) (Us)
 (1   s)Ashs
i E
s
J(b )(k
s(1 )
j )  
1
i
h
s(1+ )
i
1 +  
  (cs
I + cs
I):
The pair of maps Hs(i;b ;); s = ne;e, describes the optimal investments in human capital of
the agents in each sector.
Let V s(i;b ;) be the associated level of utility of agent i; if active in sector s: Worker i enters
sector e if and only if
F(i;b ;)  V e(i;b ;)   V ne(i;b ;)  0;
where F(i;b ;) is agent i's utility gain due to his investment in education. It is easy to check
that, for each given (b ;); F(:) is strictly increasing in i:
Denition 1. Given ; an equilibrium of the economy with frictions is a threshold value 
F 2
[;]; and a royalty deF
J  0; such that:
i: Ks(
F;) solves (s); s = ne for each j = i such that i < 
F; s = e for each j = i such
that i  
F;
ii: Hs(i;
F;) solves (Us), s = ne for i < 
F; and s = e for i  
F;
iii: E
e
I(F)(e(i;
F;))   E
ne
I (F)(ne(i;
F;)) = deF
J > 0;
iv: F(i;
F;)  0 if and only if i  
F:
First, observe that the conditional expectations (E
s
J(b )(k
s(1 )
j );E
s
I(b )(hs
i )); s = ne;e, are
computed making reference to the actual values fHs (:);Ks(:)g, s = ne;e; so that we are
imposing rational expectations. Conditions (i   ii) impose individual optimality in the choice
of the investment. Conditions (iii   iv) impose individual optimality in the choice of the sector
where an agent is active. By (iii), each rm is indierent between being active in any of the
two sectors, so that we can impose 
P
J = 
P
I =
n
[;
F);[
F;]
o
(by iv):
The main results concerning existence of equilibria and their properties are summarized in Pro-
position 1. The proof is in the appendix. Here we just provide an outline of the argument. First,
given an arbitrary b , we compute the values of ( e Hs(i;b ;); e Ks(b ;)), s = ne;e, the demand
functions for investment in human and physical capital obtained imposing that (conditional on
b ) expectations are fullled (see eqs. (A3) and (A4) in the appendix). Occasionally, we will re-
fer to ( e Hs(i;b ;); e Ks(b ;)) and the derived maps e V s(i;b ;) and e s(i;b ;) as the equilibrium
maps conditional on b :
Let e F(i;b ;) be the analogous of map F (:); obtained using ( e Hs(i;b ;); e Ks(b ;)): Given that
e F(i;b ;) is strictly increasing in i, e F(i;b ;) = 0 at i = b  gives us the equilibrium value of
the threshold, i.e., 
F (): Hence, 
F () is the solution to the equation
e F(i = b ;b ;)  f(b ;)   (ce
I + ce
I) = 0;
where, by direct computation (and using (A3) and (A4)),
f(b ;)  b 

1+  

AeE
e
I(b )(

1+  
i )(1 )
 1+ 
 
e ()   (1)
b 

1+  

AneE
ne
I (b )(

1+  
i )(1 )
 1+ 
 
ne ():
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1+  (1   s)
1+ 
 


1
 
1+ 
 

(1 )(1 )
p(1+s)
 (1+ )(1 )
 
, are scalars
depending upon the exogenous parameters.
Proposition 1. Fix (;) and let  = (;;0;0;0): Given ( ;Ae;Ane;), there are

C;C
	
>> 0
such that; for almost every ce
I 2 (C; e C); there is an equilibrium with threshold value 
F () 2
 
;

: Moreover, given ( ;Ane); there is A
e such that, for each Ae > A
e; the equilibrium is
unique and
@f(:)
@b  jb =F > 0: Also,
@
F(:)
@e > 0;
@
F(:)
@ne < 0;
@
F(:)
@ce
I > 0;
@
F(:)
@Ae < 0 and
@
F(:)
@Ane > 0;
where 
F(Ae;Ane;) is the function associating with the vector  the (unique) equilibrium
threshold. The same results hold, given (Ae;Ane); for   suciently small.
Proof. See the appendix.
Given the focus of the paper, it is convenient to consider a vector  with the stated pro-
perties, just to simplify computations. Nothing relevant depends upon this restriction. In the
following, we will mostly consider the leading case where
@f(:)
@b  jb =F > 0 at each equilibrium
threshold:16 This restriction delivers two dierent properties for equilibria. First,
@f(:)
@b  > 0 at
each equilibrium threshold implies its uniqueness. Secondly, by the implicit function theorem,
the comparative statics properties depend upon the derivatives of the equilibrium conditions
with respect to the exogenous parameters (Ae;Ane;) and b : The signs of these derivatives
with respect to (Ae;Ane;) are always uniquely dened. Hence, the comparative statics of the
equilibrium threshold just depends upon the sign of
@f(:)
@b  jb =F; and to restrict the analysis to
economies with
@f(:)
@b  jb =F > 0 at each 
F allows us to obtain well-dened results. Dierent
sets of restrictions on the parameters would guarantee that
@f(:)
@b  jb =F > 0: The ones proposed
above seem fairly weak and natural. That some additional restrictions are necessary to obtain
@f(:)
@b  jb =F > 0 at each equilibrium is shown in Example A1 (in the appendix). There we con-
struct an economy with
@f(:)
@b  > 0 for b  suciently close to  and negative for b  large enough.
Given that
@f(:)
@b  is continuous on [;]; for this economy f(:) has at least one local maximum,
. Hence, each economy with ce
I such that ce
I < f(); and close enough to f(); has at least two
equilibria. The precise magnitude of the restriction on the ratio Ae=Ane obviously depend upon
the precise values of (;; ): Numerical simulation suggest that they are not overly restrictive.
Let's compare the equilibrium allocation of this economy to the one of the associated Walrasian
economy (the one with perfect contractibility and competitive wages). There are three main
results. Fix  = 0: Pareto ineciency of equilibria is obvious, because, in the economy with
frictions, a rm's investment does not depend upon the value of i of the worker it is matched
with, while it does at any Pareto ecient allocation: Second, the Walrasian equilibrium of the
same economy dominates the equilibrium of this economy in terms of total expected surplus,
but it is not necessarily Pareto superior. Indeed, at  = 0; and using (A3) and (A4) in the
appendix, the physical/human capital ratio at the two allocations satisfy
e Ks(
F)
e Hs(i;
F)
=
0
@
(1   )
1
 E
s
I(F)(
a
1+  
i )
1


1
1+  
i
1
A KWs (i)
HWs (i)
;
where the superscript \W" denotes the equilibrium values at the Walrasian allocation. If 
F is
large enough, compared to , and for suciently small i; in sector ne the term in brackets is
always greater than one; so that
e K
ne(
F)
e Hne(i;F) >
K
Wne(i)
HWne(i): This immediately implies that agents
with a suciently low i are better o at the equilibrium of the frictional economy. A third
16 To avoid misunderstandings: e F(i;b ;) is always strictly increasing in i: The function f(b ;) is obtained
setting i = b  and it does not necessarily have this property.
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F can be either lower or higher than its value in the
Walrasian economy. For instance, let  = 0; set [;] = [1;2]; Ae = 2;Ane = 1;  =  = 1=2; and
  = 2: By direct computation, one can verify that, for ce
I < 0:7; 
F < 
W, while the opposite
occurs for ce
I > 0:71: Hence, lack of contractibility always induces Pareto ineciency because
of lower than optimal investments, while it has an ambiguous eect on the size of the set of
people investing in education. From this viewpoint, therefore, it does not induce unambiguously
overeducation (or undereducation).
Finally, consider the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium allocation along any sequence
fAevg
v=1
v=1 with Aev ! Ane: Let f(b ;Ae;Ane) be the function obtained from f(b ;) setting
 = 0 and making explicit its dependence on (Ae;Ane) (similarly for 
F (Ae;Ane)): It is easy
to check that lim b !f(b ;Ae;Ane) > 0; for each Ae  Ane: Hence, there is an interval of
values of ce
I such that the associated equilibrium threshold is strictly smaller than  even if
Ae = Ane.17 Hence, the equilibrium investments in high skill human capital is positive even
when this skill is completely useless, from the technological viewpoint. When Ae = Ane; the
two sectors are essentially identical, while to operate in sector e, requires the use of costlier
skills. Therefore, Pareto eciency requires us to shut down this sector. This is similar to what
happens in signalling models.
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the policy implications of workers' self-selection
into distinct labor markets. However, it is interesting to consider the comparative statics of
equilibria, also because the welfare eects of dierent policies comes through their impact on
the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables.
Let   (;Ae;Ane): Let ws(i;
F;) be worker i's wage in sector s: The standard deviation,


s
I(F )(
F;); measures the variability of wages within sector s. WP

e
I(F )(
F;) is the wage
premium.18
Proposition 2. Fix ( ;ce
I;;): Assume that
@f(:)
@b  jb =F() > 0: At  = 0; the following sign
restrictions are satised:19
2
6 6
6
6 6
6
6 6
6
6 6
6
6 6
6 6
4
de dne ce
I dAe dAne
E
e
I(F())( e He(:)) ?   + ? +
E
ne
I (F())( e Hne(:)) +   +   +
e Ke(:) ?   + ? +
e Kne(:) +   +   +
E
e
I(F()) (we(:)) ?   + ? +
E
ne
I (F()) (wne(:)) +   +   +

ne
I (F()) (:) +   +   +
WP
e
I(F()) (:)   +   +  
3
7 7
7
7 7
7
7 7
7
7 7
7 7
7
7 7
5
:
17 Depending upon the values of the other parameters, we may have (at least) two equilibria with dierent
thresholds, or a unique equilibrium. What is relevant is that there is always some level of investment in \high
skills".
18 In general, there are three dierent notions of wage premium:
we(:)
wne(:), E
e
I(F )

we(:)
wne(:)

and
E
ne
I (F )

we(:)
wne(:)

: Due to linearity of the wage function with respect to (

1+  
i ) in each sector, here
they coincide.
19 Each cell reports the sign of the derivative of the function on the row with respect to the variable on its
column. We omit the standard deviation of the wages of skilled workers. For this variable, it is impossible
to reach any well-dened, general result. For reasonable values of the parameters,  = 2
3 and   > 1
2; some
numerical simulations show that the composition eect has the sign opposite to the one of @F
@ : Therefore,
@
e
I(F )(:)
@ is positive for 0 2 fe;Aeg; negative for 0 2

ne;ce
I;Ane	
:
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is based on the interaction of the incentive and the composition eect. For instance, consider an
increase in ne; i.e., in the marginal tax rate on the labor income of the ne workers. As a pure
incentive eect, dne > 0 reduces their eort in education, and pushes down the threshold 
F.
Hence, because of the composition eect, it reduces the (conditional) expected human capital of
both low and high skilled workers. This, in turn, reduces investments in physical capital in both
sectors. This negative feed-back strengthens the initial impacts. Hence, the eects on expected
human and physical capitals and on wages are negative in both sectors. For the wage premium,
by direct computation, it turns out that both direct and composition eects are positive. The
standard deviation of wages of unskilled workers decreases because both eects are negative.
On the other hand, de > 0 has unambiguously a positive eect on the level of human (and,
consequently, of physical) capital and on the wages in the ne sector, because it increases the value
of 
F() (composition eect). Indeed, given that the expected human capital of the pool of ne
workers increases because of the increase in e; physical capital also increases, stimulating these
workers' optimal investments. The impact in the e sector is ambiguous because the incentive
eect reduces the optimal investment in human capital. However, the composition eect acts in
the opposite direction, because it induces workers with a (relatively) low value of i to switch
to the low skill sector. This has a positive impact on the expected level of human capital in the
e sector and, therefore, on the investments in physical capital, inducing a positive feed-back.
The eect of exogenous changes in technology, (dAe;dAne); can be explained basically in the
same way. In particular, in this set-up, \skill biased" technical change (dAe > 0;dAne = 0) has
a negative impact on the expected human, and physical, capital and on the wages in the \low
skill" sector, an ambiguous impact in the \high skill" one, and a positive eect on the wage
premium.
4. Eciency properties of equilibria
We have already argued that the equilibria of the economy with frictions are Pareto inecient.
We will now show that they do not satisfy either a weaker criterion of constrained optimality
(CO in the sequel) which takes into account the imperfections which characterize the econo-
my. Most interesting is the analysis of their ineciency in terms of the amount, and type,
of investments. In the sequel, we will mainly refer to investments in human capital. Similar
considerations hold for the ones in physical capital.
In our set-up, ineciencies can be of two dierent types. First, an individual can choose an
amount of investment dierent from the CO one, given the partition 
P
I associated with the
CO allocation. We will refer to this possible source of ineciency as underinvestment (or over-
investment) in educational eort. Secondly, an agent can choose to invest in a type of education
dierent from the one assigned to her at the CO allocation. We will say that there is underin-
vestment in educational level when agent i invests in education ne; while, at the CO allocation,
she should invest in education level e:
In the one-sector model, equilibria are unambiguously characterized by underinvestment in
educational eort. Here, the same eect is at work: in each sector, given any arbitrary b ;
an increase in the investments of rms and workers leads to a Pareto improvement. Once we
consider an arbitrarily xed threshold b ; the argument is identical to the one in Acemoglu (1996):
Set  = 0 (and omit it, for notational convenience). Fix b ; so that each sector is identical to
the economy analyzed there, and consider a small change in the investment of each agent. The
changes in utilities and producers' surplus evaluated at the equilibrium (conditional on b ) pair
( e Hs(i;b ); e Ks(b )) (and taking into account that investments in physical capital are j invariant)
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0
@As
"
e Ks(b )
e Hs(i;b )
#1 
 
1
i
e Hs(i;b ) 
1
Adh +
 
(1   )As
 
e Hs(i;b )
e Ks(b )
!!
dk > 0 (2)
and
0
@(1   )(1   )AsE
s
I(b )( e Hs(i;b ))
e Ks(b )   p
1
Adk+
0
@(1   )As e Ks(b )(1 )
E
s
I(b )( e Hs(i;b )(1 ))
1
Adh > 0;
(3)
respectively. The inequalities hold because the rst terms in parentheses in (2) and (3) are zero,
at the optimal solutions of (s) and (Us); while the second terms are positive. Hence, given
any b ; there is underinvestment in educational eort and physical capital, in each sector. This
establishes, in a more direct way, the Pareto ineciency of the equilibria of our economy.
In the two-sector case, there is a second potential source of ineciency, because changes in
the value of b  may also entail Pareto improvements. An increase in the threshold value b 
increases the conditional expected amount of human capital in both sectors at the same time
and, consequently, induces an increase in the amount of physical investments of rms in both
sectors. Indeed, given that 

1+  
i is a strictly monotonically increasing function,
@E
s
I(b )(

1+  
i )
@b 
> 0, for each s and b ; (4)
and, consequently, using (A3) and (A4),
@ e H
s(i;b )
@b  > 0 and
@ e K
s(b )
@b  > 0; for each s and b : More
relevant, from (A5); (A6) and (4), for each i and b ;
@e V
s(i;b )
@b  > 0 and
@E
s
I(b )(e 
s(i;b ))
@b  > 0:
These properties do not suce to establish our claim, because a change in the threshold induces
a jump in the producer's surplus for the rms shifting from one sector to the other: We will get
back to this issue later on.
To analyze the welfare properties of equilibria, it is convenient to introduce an explicit notion
of (constrained) eciency. As usual in economies with imperfect markets, we consider the
metaphor of a benevolent planner choosing an allocation while facing constraints aiming to
capture the ones the agents face in the decentralized economy. We provide two results. First,
we show that there are constrained optimal allocations (Proposition 3), and that they can
be attained with an appropriate system of taxes and subsidies (Corollary 1). The amount of
subsidies and taxes is entirely dictated by the features of the CO allocation, and they can
be quite large. That's why, in Prop. 4 and 5, we study the eects of small changes in taxes
and subsidies on total surplus evaluated at the market equilibrium, taking as given the actual
demand and supply functions of the agents. Proposition 4 considers generic changes in taxes
and subsidies. In Proposition 5, we consider revenue neutral changes:
Bear in mind that, in the following, we always consider changes in total surplus. We are not con-
cerned with actual Pareto improvements. However, given that utility functions are quasi-linear,
an increase in total surplus immediately translates (modulo an appropriate - and i contingent
- system of lump-sum taxes and transfers) into a Pareto improvement.
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The objective function of the planner is P
 
hs
i;ks
j;
s
I;
s
J

; the sum of the expected utilities and
producers' surpluses of the agents. His policy instruments are the partitions 
P
I and 
P
J and a
pair of maps (HCOs(i;b );KCOs(b )): We restrict the partitions to have the structure 
e
I(b ) =

e
J(b ) = [b ;]: Given that rms are ex-ante identical, the informational constraints embedded
into the denition of P (:); and the properties of the (implicit) matching function, to impose
this structure on 
P
I and 
P
J does not entail any loss of generality. Also, observe that, given
that rms are identical, expected total surplus and realized total surplus coincide.
We dene an allocation Constrained Optimal (or CO) if and only if it solves the planner's
optimization problem. Let 
CO be the level of the threshold associated with the CO allocation.
Proposition 3. Under the maintained assumptions, there is a CO allocation. Equilibrium al-
locations are never CO, and are characterized by underinvestment in the amount of physical
capital and in educational eort. 
F > 
CO and 
F < 
CO can both occur.
Proof. See the appendix.
The source of ineciency considered by Acemoglu (1996) reappears in our set-up, because,
given any threshold level b ; HCOs(i;b ) > e Hs(i;b ); for each i; and KCOs(b ) > e Ks(b ). On
the other hand, the relation between 
CO and 
F is not univocal. In the proof in the appendix,
we provide an example of an economy such that 
F < 
CO if the direct costs of education are
suciently low, while 
F > 
CO for suciently high values of ce
I. In interpreting this result, bear
in mind that, in computing 
F and 
CO; we use dierent investment functions: ( e Hs(:); e Ks(:))
and
 
HCOs(:);KCOs(:)

; respectively. On the other hand, in Corollary 1, we show that, once
the optimal subsidies (;) are introduced, to implement the CO allocation we always need
ce
I > 0: Thus, given the optimal taxes, CO always requires us to shrink the set of agents
investing in the high skill sector.
It is easy to see that the CO distribution of investments in human and physical capital can
be attained with an appropriate system of taxes and subsidies. Given that preferences are
quasi-linear, the system of tax and subsidies can be balanced using uniform lump-sum taxes on
workers (in the absence of positive endowments of consumption goods, this could entail negative
consumption for some subset of agents).
Corollary 1. There is a system of taxes and subsidies ; with ce
I > 0; such that the associated
equilibrium allocation is CO.
Proof. See the appendix.
In our set-up (as well as in Acemoglu (1996)), equilibria of the economy with frictions are
constrained inecient for each value of ; because, at  = 0; even if 
CO = 
F; for each ;
e Hs(i;
CO)
HCOs(i;
CO)
= (1   )
1 
  
1
  6= 1; for each s and i;
and
e Ks(
CO)
KCOs(
CO)
= (1   )
1+  
  
1
  6= 1; for each s:
In the usual random matching model, constrained eciency is obtained when the Hosios-
condition is satised, i.e., when  is equal to the absolute value of the elasticity of the matching
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(1996, p. 789), the externalities are related to \the value of the future matches and are always
positive". Moreover, the distribution of workers across sectors may fail to be optimal, but this
induces a market failure dierent from the one due to the congestion externality characteri-
zing the usual economies with random matching. This is why here the Hosios-condition has no
connection with eciency.
4.2. Welfare improving tax policies
We conclude considering the welfare eects of alternative tax schemes. Tax changes have two
distinct eects. First, they may change the marginal return of the investment in eort, given
the type of skill an individual acquires. This is a direct incentive eect. Second, they aect the
distribution of workers in the two sectors. This is the composition eect, which, in turn, chan-
ges the marginal return of the investment in eort because of its eect on the optimal level of
investment in physical capital. The role of the \composition eect" in our economy has peculiar
features. A marginal change in the threshold  () has no direct eect on total workers' sur-
plus, because, by denition of equilibrium, V ne(i = 
F ();
F ()) = V e(i = 
F ();
F ()):
Similarly, given that a rm's expected prots are equal across sectors, the \direct" composition
eect on total expected prots is zero. Unfortunately, in our set-up, due to the (strictly positive)
royalties, typically, at the margin, the producer's surplus in the high skill sector is strictly larger
than in the other sector. This follows from the particular structure of our economy, that we
have justied above. In the welfare analysis, this makes it harder for our main results to hold,
because the indirect impact of the composition eect has to be suciently large to compensate
its (negative) direct impact on welfare. This indirect eect goes rst through the positive im-
pact of the increase in the (conditional) expectation of the level of human capital in each sector
on the rms' investments in physical capital. Generally speaking, the mechanism at work here
holds true in a stronger form in any economy with self-selection of agents in distinct sectors
and where there is some positive feed-back between the variables of interest and the conditional
expectation of some feature of the pool of agents self-selecting in one market.20
Therefore, in the proof of the two nal Propositions, we need additional restrictions on the
exogenous parameters, sucient to guarantee that the composition eect on welfare of an
increase in the threshold is positive. They are formulated implicitly, as an upper bound on
the value of the equilibrium threshold (i.e., on the direct cost of education, given the other
parameters). They do not appear unreasonable. For instance, x, as usual,  = 2
3;  = 1
10
and  = 0: Set 
I = [1;4]: For    1; i.e., given an elastic eort supply, and A
ne
Ae = 0:9; the
composition eect is always positive for 
F  1:7: The interval of values of 
F such that it is
positive is decreasing in  :
Consider as a starting point an economy with a at labor income tax. An increase of taxes
on the direct cost of education (ce
I) has a pure composition eect, due to quasi-linearity of
the utility functions. Changes in the marginal tax rates have both incentive and composition
eects: As obvious, an increase in the marginal rate on high income individuals (i.e., in our set
up, on the high skill workers) has a negative direct incentive eect, but a positive composition
eect. Changes in the marginal tax rate on the low income workers have negative incentive
20 Charlot and Decreuse (2005) consider a two-sectors, dynamic random search model. There, an increase in the
value of the threshold improves the conditional expectation of the productivities of the workers in both sectors.
This makes it protable for rms to create new vacancies and, therefore, leads to a decrease in unemployment
in each sector. This may entail a welfare improvement. In a way, in their model creation of vacancies has a
role similar to the one played here by the increase in physical investments. A similar mechanism is also at
play in the model with islands and perfectly competitive spot labor markets outlined at the end of Section 2.
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intuition is fairly simple, also given Prop. 2 above. For instance, dne > 0 has a direct, negative
incentive eect on eort in this sector: It also makes convenient for some subset of workers to
move to sector e; so that it moves down the value of the threshold. Hence, it has a negative
composition eect on eort and, in turn, on investments in physical capital, in both sectors. To
the contrary, in the case of de > 0; the impacts on total surplus of incentive and composition
eects have opposite signs and, under suitable conditions, the second can actually dominate, so
that we can obtain a welfare improvement by moving from a at income tax to a progressive
one.
Let's make formal the heuristic argument above. Given ; workers and rms choose their indi-
vidually optimal behavior. Let S() be the expected total surplus at the equilibrium associated
with the vector  of policy instruments: Let R() be the total tax revenue. Then,
S(
F();) 
X
s
 Z

s
J(F())
E
s
I(F())(e s(:))dj +
Z

s
I(F())
e V s(:)di
!
+ R(
F();)):
The rst set of results concerns the eects of a change of one of the tax rates.
Proposition 4. Consider an equilibrium associated with an arbitrary  = (;;ce
I);  > 0
and suciently small, and satisfying
@f(:)
@b  jb =F() > 0. Then, for

;

large enough and 
F ()
suciently close to ,
i: dce
I > 0; and suciently small, increases total surplus,
ii: dne < 0; and suciently small, increases total surplus,
iii: de < 0; and suciently small, may decrease total surplus.
The proofs of (i;ii) are in the appendix, where we also establish that the welfare eect of a
change of e is, in general, indeterminate. The third statement is shown in Example A3, also
in the appendix. The two assumptions on the support

;

and the value of 
F () guarantee
that the composition eect
@S(
F();)
@F() is positive.
Changes in expected surplus are our measure of welfare gains and losses. However, dierent
policy instruments have dierent implications also in terms of individual welfare. Under the
maintained assumptions, a decrease in the value of ne (or an increase of ce
I) has a positive
impact on the utility level of all the workers and on the expected prots of each rm (the eect
on the equilibrium level of the royalties is, however, indeterminate, in general). On the contrary,
a decrease in e has always a negative impact on the utility of all the workers in sector ne (and
on the expected surplus of all the rms active in this sector). It may have a positive or negative
impact on utility and surplus of agents active in sector e; and on the equilibrium royalties.
Consider now policies where reductions in the income taxes are nanced through taxes on the
direct costs of education, or by revenue neutral changes (de;dne).
Proposition 5. Let  = (;;ce
I); with ce
I  0: Consider balanced budget policies (de;dne)
and (ds;dce
I): Under the assumptions of Prop. 1, (de; dne) >> 0 and ( dne;dce
I) >>
(0;0) increase expected total surplus, ( de;dce
I) >> (0;0) may decrease it.
The proof is in the appendix. The rst result implies that some (small) degree of progressiveness
in the labor income taxation is welfare improving. Under the assumptions of Prop. 5, an increase
in the value of the equilibrium threshold is welfare improving. In the proof, we show that a
revenue neutral policy (de; dne) >> 0 always has a positive eect on 
F (): Hence, the
composition eect increases welfare. It also turns out that, for  suciently small (we need to
IAB-Discussion Paper 7/2011 18be on the increasing part of the Laer curve), the direct incentive eect of a revenue neutral
tax change is also positive. Therefore, this policy change is unambiguously welfare improving.
The second result can be explained along the same lines. On the other hand, a decrease in e;
balanced by an increase in ce
I has an ambiguous eect on welfare. The pure incentive eect of
the policy is welfare improving. The dierence with respect to the previous case is that now the
total eect of the policy on the equilibrium threshold depends in a non-trivial way upon the
parameters, because de < 0 makes investment in education more appealing, while dce
I > 0
acts in the opposite direction. The total eect on welfare is, therefore, indeterminate. However,
in general, the revenue neutral policy ( de;ce
I) >> 0 has a larger positive (or a smaller
negative) eect on welfare than a pure reduction of the marginal labor income tax rate.
Finally, we have been considering a sector-contingent vector of subsidy rates (e;ne): This is
certainly an unusual feature of the policy. However, let ws(i;
F) be agent i's labor income in
sector s: It is easy to check that
max

ne
I (F)
wne(i;
F)  wne(
F;
F) < we(
F;
F)  min

e
I(F)
we(i;
F):
Hence, given the properties of the utility functions, the same results can be obtained with a
standard system of step-linear taxes or subsidies.
5. Conclusions
The paper considers a class of economies where we model both extensive and intensive margins
of investment choices. The main conclusion is that the results typically obtained in an eciency
unit set-up (which considers only the intensive margin) can fail to be robust to its natural
extension to a Roy's model with optimal choice of investments in human and physical capital.
The eciency unit framework rules out, by assumption, all the phenomena induced by the self-
selection of the agents into dierent labor markets and, therefore, all the welfare consequences
related to the composition eect.
Our analysis is carried out for a simple, parametric class of economies. This allows us to compute
explicitly the equilibria and the welfare eects of dierent policies, and to compare directly our
results with the ones of Acemoglu (1996). Evidently, to consider quasi-linear utility function is
restrictive, in particular in the analysis of the welfare impact of the various policies. However,
rst, an extension of the analysis to a richer environment is possible, but at a high cost in terms
of analytical tractability. Secondly, all the results are \open", so that they certainly survive in
environments where income eects are suciently small. What matters most, the basic intuition
behind the welfare results is strong, and they should be robust to many possible extensions of
the basic set-up.
There are two main messages of the paper: in environments characterized by lack of contrac-
tibility, irreversibility of the investments in human capital generates a hold-up problem. This
tends to depress investments below their optimal level, so that a pecuniary externality in human
capital is generated. However, if workers self-select into distinct labor markets by investing in
dierent types of human capital, a second distortion arises whenever wages are an increasing
function of the conditional expectation of the level of human capital of workers active in a
market. In our model this is induced by the positive eect of this expectation on the level
of the investments in physical capital. This second externality may induce overinvestment in
education at the extensive margin. While both phenomena have been previously discussed in
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on welfare. From a strictly theoretical viewpoint, our result is in the same spirit of Acemoglu
(1996): There is a positive externality induced by the conditional expectations of the level of
human capital investments in each sector. It acts primarily via their eects on investments in
physical capital. The policy implications are, however, sharply dierent. Without self-selection,
any policy which provides a positive incentive to the workers' choice on the intensive margin
is welfare improving. With self-selection, the welfare improving eect of such a policy must
be evaluated also taking into account its, possibly welfare worsening, impact on the choices at
the extensive margin. For instance: we have established that, starting with a at labor income
tax rate, a small, revenue neutral, change in the marginal tax rates, making the tax system
progressive, can be welfare improving. It is straightforward to check that this can never happen
in the one sector version of the model.
6. Appendix
3A. Equilibrium
We start with an arbitrary threshold b : The rst order conditions (FOCs in the sequel) of
problem (s) imply
Ks
j(E
s
I(b ) (hs
i );) =
"
(1   )(1   )AsE
s
I(b ) (hs
i )
p(1 + 
s)
# 1

(A1)
The ones of optimization problem (Us) imply
Hs
i (E
s
J(b )(k
s1 
j );) =
h
i (1   s)AsE
s
J(b )(k
s1 
j )
i 1
1+  
: (A2)
Given that rms in sector s are, ex-ante, identical, Ks
j(:) = Ks(:); so that E
s
J(b )(Ks
j(:)1 ) =
Ks(:)1 :
Let   1+ 
1+  ; so that (   1)  
1+  :
Solving (A1) and (A2), by imposing that expectations are fullled, we obtain
e Ks(b ;) =

(1   )(1   )
p(1 + 
s)
E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 1+  
 
(A3)
((1   s))
1
  As
1+ 
  ;
and
e Hs(i;b ;) =

(1   )(1   )
p(1 + 
s)
E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 1 
 
(A4)

1
1+  
i ((1   s))
1
  As 1
 :
Using these functions, agent i's utility, at the b  conditional equilibrium and if active in sector
s, is
e V s(i;b ;)  Us
i ( e Hs(i;b ;); e Ks(b ;)) =  (cs
I + cs
I) (A5)
+

(1   )(1   )
p(1 + 
s)
E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 (1+ )(1 )
 
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 1
i ((1   s))
1+ 
  As
1+ 
  
1
  1

:
Similarly, given an arbitrary b ; rm j (ex-post) surplus, if active in sector s and matched with
worker i, is
e s(i;b ;) = (1   )As
1+ 
  ((1   s))
1
 


 1
i   (1   )E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )



(1   )(1   )
p(1 + 
s)
E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 (1+ )(1 )
 
: (A6)
Its expected value is
E
s
I(b )(e s(i;b ;)) =

(1   )(1   )
p(1 + 
s)
E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 1+  
 
(A7)

p(1 + 
s)((1   s))
1
  As
1+ 
 
(1   )
:
Proof of Prop. 1. Consider an arbitrary vector ; with e = ne and  = 0; so that e () =
ne ().
Pick the partition 
P
I (b ) induced by any arbitrary b : Assume that there is an agent i0 such
that i0 = b  at b  solving F(b ;b ) = 0: Evidently, e F(i;b )  0 if and only if i  b : Hence, each
equilibrium partition 
P
I such that 
s
I 6= ;, each s, satises 
e
I(
F) = [
F;]; as claimed in the
text.
For each threshold b ; and each s; E
s
I(b )(
 1
i ) is the conditional expectation of a strictly
increasing function; hence it is strictly increasing in b  and well-dened on

;

: It follows that
f(b ) is continuous and strictly positive for each b  2

;

; including the boundary points. Let
min
[;]
f(b )  C  0 and C  max
[;]
f(b ) > C; because f(b ) is clearly not constant over

;

: Then,
by the intermediate value theorem, for each ce
I such that ce
I 2

C;C

; there is 
F () 2

;

such that f(
F ();
F ())   ce
I = 0: Evidently, for most of the values of ce
I; 
F () 2
 
;

:
Using (A7), and given that E
e
I(b )(
 1
i ) > E
ne
I (b )(
 1
i ); and Ae > Ane;
deF
J =
h
E
e
I(F())(e e(i;
F ()))   E
ne
I (F())(e ne(i;
F ()))
i
> 0:
Hence, all the equilibrium conditions are satised at 
F (). This establishes the rst part of
the Proposition.
We now proceed to study uniqueness of equilibrium and its comparative statics properties.
Clearly,
@ e F(:)
@ce
I =  1 < 0; and
@f(:)
@s = ( 1)
'(s) 
F 1(AsE
s
I(F)(
 1
i )(1 ))
1+ 
  s ()
(1   s)
1 +  
 
;
with '(e) = 1 and '(ne) = 2; so that
@f(:)
@e < 0 and
@f(:)
@ne > 0. Also,
@f(:)
@Ae > 0 and
@f(:)
@Ane < 0:
Hence, the signs of the comparative statics properties, and uniqueness of equilibrium, could
be immediately established if the sign of
@f(:)
@b  jb =F() were uniquely dened. Unfortunately,
this is not the case. As established in Example A1 below, there are economies with multiple
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@f(:)
@b  jb =F() varies across them. Hence, to establish the
second part of Prop. 1, we need to impose additional restrictions on the parameter space. By
direct computation,
@f(:)
@b 
= (   1)
1
b 
f(:) +
(1   )(1 +  )
 
b 
 1
b 
()
[Ae
1+ 
  E
e
I(b )(
 1
i )
(1 )(1+ )
  e(b )   ()Ane
1+ 
  E
ne
I (b )(
 1
i )
(1 )(1+ )
  ne(b )];
where s(b ) is the elasticity of E
s
I(b )(
 1
i ) with respect to b ;
e(b ) 
 b 

(  b ) +b (

 b 

)
(  b )(

 b 

)
and ne(b ) 
b 

(b    )  b (b 

  
)
(b    )(b 

  
)
:
With a straightforward manipulation, we obtain
sign
@f(:)
@b 
= sign
0
B
B B
B
B B
@
(   1)
0
@1  
 A
ne
Ae
 1+ 
 

E
ne
I (b )(
 1
i )
E
e
I(b )(
 1
i )
 (1 )(1+ )
 
1
A
+
(1 )(1+ )
 
0
@e(b )  
 A
ne
Ae
 1+ 
 

E
ne
I (b )(
 1
i )
E
e
I(b )(
 1
i )
 (1 )(1+ )
 
ne(b )
1
A
1
C
C
C C
C C
A
:
The rst term is strictly positive.
Dene Ge()  (

  
)   
  
   

as the numerator of e(): Geometrically, it is easy to
see that Ge() > 0: Also, Ge() = 0: If there is e  such that Ge(e ) < 0; there must also be 
such that Ge() < 0 and
@G
e()
@ j= > 0: However,
@Ge()
@
= 

  ( + 1)
   2
 1 +  ( + 1)

= (

  
)   2
 1(  b ) < 0
at each  such that Ge() < 0; because  > 1: The contradiction implies that Ge()  0; for
each  2 [;]: Hence, e()  0; for each  2 [;]:
Consider now ne(b ): Iterated applications of de L'H^ opital's rule show that lim
b !
e(b ) =
 1
2 >
0 and ne(b ) is clearly bounded. Evidently,
E
ne
I (b )(
 1
i )
E
e
I(b )(
 1
i ) < 1: Hence, given (; ); for
 A
ne
Ae

suciently small,
@f(:)
@b  > 0:
Alternatively, x A
ne
Ae  1: For any sequence  v ! 0; the associated sequence
 A
ne
Ae
 1+ v
 v
 
E
ne
I (b )(
v 1
i )
E
e
I(b )(
v 1
i )
! (1 )(1+ v)
 v
also converges to zero, while (v 1) converges to 
1  >
0: For each  ; lim
b !
ne(b ) =
 1
2 ; which converges to 
2(1 ) for   ! 0: Also, for each b  > ;
lim
 !0
ne(b ) is uniformly bounded above. It follows that, given A
ne
Ae  1 and  2 (0;1);
@f(:)
@b  > 0
at each b  2

;

, for   suciently small.
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3;   = 3: Fix e = ne; and
choose (Ae;Ane) such that
 A
ne
Ae
2
= 0:984: Then,

1
Ae
2 f(b )
()
= b 
1
5
0
@5
6
2
6
5  b 
6
5
2  b 
1
A
2
3
  0:984 b 
1
5
0
@5
6
b 
6
5   1
b    1
1
A
2
3
:
By direct computation, lim
b !1
f(b )
() = 0:06940,
f(1:3)
() = 0:06953 and lim
b !2
f(b )
() = 0:06924: Therefore,
@f(b )
@b  > 0 at some b  2 (1;1:3) and
@f(b )
@b  < 0 at some b 
0
2 (1:3;2).
Also, set
 A
ne
Ae

= 1: By numerical computation, for   large, say   = 3;
@f(b )
@b  < 0: For   2
(2;2:1); it is (inverted) U-shaped, for   < 1:9,
@f(b )
@b  > 0:
4A. Eciency properties of equilibria
4.1A. Constrained optimal allocations
The planner's objective function is
P
 
hs
i;ks
j;
s
I;
s
J


X
s
Z

s
I(b )
"
E
s
J(b )(Ashs
i k
s(1 )
j )  
1
i
h
s(1+ )
i
1 +  
  cs
I
#
di
+
X
s
Z

s
J(b )
h
(1   )E
s
I(b )(Ashs
i k
s(1 )
j )   pks
j
i
dj:
Given that the optimal choice ks
j is j invariant and that (
s
I(b )) = (
s
J(b )); it can be
rewritten as
P(hs
i;ks;b ) =
X
s
Z

s
I(b )
 
Ashs
i ks(1 )  
1
i
h
s(1+ )
i
1 +  
!
di  
X
s
(cs
I + pks)(
s
I(b )):
The planner's optimization problem is
max
(hs
i;ks;b )
P(hs
i;ks;b ):
It is convenient to decompose it into three problems. First, given an arbitrary value b ; we
determine the maps (HCOs(i;b );KCOs(b )) solving, for each s, the optimization problem
max
(hs
i;ks)
Ps
b  (hs
i;ks) 
Z

s
I(b )
"
Ashs
i ks(1 )  
1
i
h
s(1+ )
i
1 +  
#
di (Ps
)
 (cs
I + pks)(
s
I(b )):
Next, given the value functions Ps(b ) of the two problems (Ps
b  ); s = ne;e; we recast problem
(P) as
max
b 
P(b )  Pe(b ) + Pne(b ); (P)
nding the optimal value of b ; 
CO:
Proof of Prop. 3. Given that optimization problem (Ps
b  ) is concave, each s, its solution is
completely characterized by the FOCs:
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@P
s
b  (h
s
i;k
s)
@hi = Asks(1 )h
s( 1)
i   1
ihs 
i = 0;
ii:
@P
s
b  (h
s
i;k
s)
@k = (1   )Asks( ) R

s
I(b ) hs
i di   p
R

s
I(b ) di = 0;
which imply
a: KCOs(b ) = As
1+ 
  
1
 

1 
p E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 1+  
 
;
b: HCOs(i;b ) = 
1
1+  
i 
1
 As 1
 

1 
p E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
 1 
 
:
Comparing a   b to (A3)   (A4), KCOs(b ) > Ks(b ) and HCOs(i;b ) > Hs(i;b ); for each b ;
i and s. Therefore, equilibria are always characterized by underinvestment in physical capi-
tal and in the eort in education. Demand and supply functions are clearly well-dened and
continuous at each b  2 [;]: By substituting in the objective function the optimal values
(KCOs(b );HCOs(i;b )), we obtain
bP(b ) 
 
1 +  
X
s
(
e
I(b ))As
1+ 
  E
s
I(b )(
 1
i )
1+  
    (
e
I(b ))bce
I;
where 1
b  
1
 

1 
p
 (1 )(1+ )
 
: Given that P(b ) is a continuous function, problem
 
P

has a
solution, either internal or at one of the boundary points, and, therefore, CO allocations exist.
Compare a market allocation and any CO allocation. If 
CO = 
F = b ; KCOs(b ) 6= Ks(b )
and the market allocation is not CO. Otherwise, 
CO 6= 
F and constrained ineciency follows
immediately.
To establish the second part of Prop. 3, observe that, by direct computation and rearranging
terms, the (necessary) FOC of problem
 
P

can be written as
b
@P(b )
@b 
=  b 
 1 
Ae
1+ 
  E
e
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 1
i )
(1+ )(1 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  E
ne
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 1
i )
(1+ )(1 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 

+
(1   )(1 +  )
1 +     

Ae
1+ 
  E
e
I(b )(
 1
i )
1+  
    Ane
1+ 
  E
ne
I (b )(
 1
i )
1+  
 

+bce
I: (A8)
Given  = 0; suppose 
F > : The condition dening the equilibrium value 
F (i.e., the solution
to e F(b ;b ) = 0) can be recasted as
bce
I
( (1   )
1 
 )
1+ 
 
=

Ae
1+ 
  E
e
I(F)(
 1
i )
(1 )(1+ )
    Ane
1+ 
  E
ne
I (F)(
 1
i )
(1 )(1+ )
 


F 1:
Hence, at 
F;
b
@P(b )
@b 
jb =F =  bce
I
 
1   ( (1   )
1 
 )
1+ 
 
( (1   )
1 
 )
1+ 
 
!
+
(1   )(1 +  )
1 +     


Ae
1+ 
  E
e
I(F)(
 1
i )
1+  
    Ane
1+ 
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I (F)(
 1
i )
1+  
 

:
The rst term in brackets is positive. The second is positive for each value of b ; and is bounded
away from zero for each b  < : This suggests that the sign of
@P(b )
@b  jb =F is indeterminate, as
shown in the following example.
Let   = p = Ae = 1;  = 2
3; = 1
10;[;] = [1;4]; Ane = 0:9 and   = 0:8: Using the
expressions above, one can compute the values of 
F and 
CO (in the example, P(b ) is a
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for an optimal interior solution). For ce
I suciently small, 
F < 
CO: For higher values of ce
I;
the opposite occurs.
Proof of Corollary 1. Fix 
e
= 
ne
=   and e = ne =  
1 
 : Comparing (A3 A4) with
(a   b) in the last proof, given any threshold value b ; the FOCs of the individual optimization
problem in the actual economy imply that the FOCs of the (constrained) planner's optimization
problem are satised, so that the optimal choices in the economy with taxes coincide with
their constrained optimal values: To conclude, we need to nd the value of ce
I such that

F () = 
CO:
In the economy with the optimal tax rates, using the denition of b introduced in the proof of
Prop. 3, the condition dening the equilibrium value 
F  
;

is
b 
 1 
AeE
e
I(b )(
 1
i )(1 )
 1+ 
 
 b 

1+  

AneE
ne
I (b )(
 1
i )(1 )
 1+ 
 
= b(ce
I + ce
I): (A9)
Set
ce
I =
(1   )
b2

Ae
1+ 
  E
e
I(CO)(
 1
i )
1+  
    Ane
1+ 
  E
ne
I (CO)(
 1
i )
1+  
 

> 0:
Then, at ; (A9) coincides with (A8) above, so that 
F  


= 
CO. We are implicitly assuming
that the solution is unique, which is necessarily true if
@f(:)
@b  > 0 at each b : Otherwise, 
F  


=

CO is one of the equilibrium thresholds associated with :
4.2A Welfare improving tax policies
Proof of Proposition 4. Let Y s(
F ();) be the equilibrium level of the aggregate output
in sector s,
Y s(
F ();) = (
s
I(
F ()))()
1
 

(1   )(1   )
p
 (1+ )(1 )
 
(1   s)
1
  As
1+ 
  E
s
I(F())(
 1
i )
1+  
  :
The aggregate surplus is
S(
F ();) =
X
s
Y s(
F ();)

 +    
2 +     s
1 +  

  (
s
I(
F ()))ce
I:
Evidently,
@Y e(:)
@
F ()
=
1 +  
 
Y e(
F ();)
(
s
I(
F ()))
 
1     

F ()
 1 (   
F ())


  
F ()

!
and
@Y ne (:)
@
F ()
=
1 +  
 
Y ne(
F ();)
(
s
I(
F ()))
 

F ()
 1 (
F ()   )

F ()
   
  (1   )
!
:
Hence,
@S
@F()
D(:)
=
ce
I
D(:)
+
 
(1   )  

F ()
 1 (   
F ())


  
F ()

!
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
Ane
Ae
 1+ 
 
 
E
ne
I (F())(
 1
i )
E
e
I(F())(
 1
i )
! 1+  
   

F ()
 1 (
F ()   )

F ()
   
   (1   )
!
;
for D(:)  1+ 
  ( +     2+  
1+  )
Y
e(:)
(
s
I(F())).
We claim that, for [;] large enough and 
F () suciently small, @S
@F() > 0:
The rst term is bounded away from zero, for each nite . The second converges to (1   )
for any sequence f
vg
v=1
v=1 ; 
v ! and any divergent sequence
n

vov=1
v=1
: For any sequence
f
vg
v=1
v=1 ; 
v !, the last term in brackets has limit  
1+  > 0: Hence, for  large and  close
enough to , @S
@F() > 0:
Evidently,
@S(:)
@ce
I =
@S(:)
@F()
@
F()
@ce
I ; with
@
F()
@ce
I > 0; hence
@S(:)
@ce
I > 0: Also,
@S(:)
@s =
@S(:)
@s jF() +
@S(:)
@
F  


@
F ()
@s
where
@S(:)
@s jF() =  
 +     (2   s)
(1   s) 
Y s(:) < 0:
Given that
@
F()
@ne < 0;
@S(:)
@ne < 0: Finally, given that
@
F()
@e > 0; the sign of
@S(:)
@e is indetermi-
nate.
EXAMPLE A3: Welfare-improving eect of an increase in the highest marginal tax rate e.
Fix 
I = [1;6],  = 2
3;  = 1
10,   = 0:5 and A
ne
Ae = 0:9: Also, set e = 0:3; ne = 0: By
numerical computation, one can check that
@
F()
@e > 0; on [1;6]; which implies
@f
@F() > 0:
Also,
@S(:)
@F() > 0; for each 
F (): Moreover,
@S(:)
@e < 0 for 
F () 2 [1;3:5];
@S(:)
@e > 0 for

F () 2 [4;6]: Hence, if the share of highly educated workers is below 40%, an increase in the
tax progressiveness is welfare improving.
Proof of Prop. 5. Dene tax revenues as
R(:) = eY e + neY ne + (
e
I(
F ()))ce
I;
with
@R
@s = Y s (:) + s
@Y s
@s jF() + 
"
X
s
s @Y s
@
F ()
#
@
F ()
@s
= 
    (1 +  )s
(1   s) 
Y s(:) + 
"
X
s
s @Y s
@
F ()
#
@
F ()
@s ;
and
@R
@ce
I
= 


e
I(
F ())

  ce
I +
"
X
s
s
@Y s
@
F ()
#
@
F ()
@ce
I
:
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@ne
@e jR=0 =  
  (1+ )
e
(1 e)  Y e(:) +
hP
s s @Y
s
@F()
i
@
F()
@e
  (1+ )ne
(1 ne)  Y ne(:) +
hP
s s @Y s
@F()
i
@F()
@ne
:
Assume that s satises  
1+  > s; so that @R
@sjF() > 0: Consider a revenue neutral increase
in e; starting from a at income tax, : By direct computation, given that @
ne
@e jR < 0;
@S(:)
@e =  
 +     (2   )
(1   ) 

Y e (:)   Y ne (:)
 


@ne
@e jR
 



+

 +    
2 +     
1 +  
 
X
s
@Y s
@
F()
! 
X
s
@
F()
@e
!
:
For  suciently small, @R
@e > 0 and @R
@ne > 0. Hence,


 
@ne
@e jR


  =
  (1+ )
e
(1 e)  Y e(:) + 
hP
s
@Y
s
@F()
i
@
F()
@e
  (1+ )ne
(1 ne)  Y ne + 
hP
s
@Y s
@F()
i
@F()
@ne
>
Y e(:)
Y ne > 0:
The inequality holds because
@
F()
@e > 0;
@
F()
@ne < 0; while, under the maintained assumptions,
P
s
@Y
e
@F() > 0: Hence,

 Y e (:) + Y ne (:)

 

@ne
@e jR

 


>

 Y e (:) + Y ne (:)
Y e(:)
Y ne

= 0:
Consequently,
@S(:)
@de >

 +    
2 +     
1 +  
 
X
s
@Y s
@
F()
!

 
@
F()
@e +
@
F()
@ne
dne
de jR
!
> 0:
This establishes the rst result.
By the implicit function theorem,
@ce
I
@s jR=0 =  

  (1+ )
s
(1 s)  Y s(:) + 
P
s s @Y
s
@F()

@
F()
@s
(   
F ())   ce
I + 
P
s s @Y s
@F()

@F()
@ce
I
;
and
@c
e
I
@s jR=0 < 0 for  suciently small and ce
I < 0:
Consider now an increase in labor income taxes to nance xed subsidies to education. Evi-
dently,
@S
@ds =  

 +     (2   s)
(1   s) 

Y s(:) +
 
X
s

 +    
2 +     s
1 +  

@Y s
@
F ()
!

 
@
F ()
@s +
@
F ()
@ce
I
@ce
I
@s jR=0
!
:
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in brackets is negative. This shows (ii:).
In the case of changes in e;
@
F()
@e > 0; while
@
F()
@ce
I > 0 and
@c
e
I
@e jR=0 < 0; so that the sign
of the last term in brackets (and, consequently, of @S
@de) is indeterminate.
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